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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
THE EMERGING LAW OF 21ST CENTURY WAR
Harold Hongju Koh∗
I am honored to deliver this Lecture in honor of Randolph W. Thrower, a
lawyer of great distinction and integrity. It is also my pleasure to open this
important symposium on redefined national security threats. This symposium
explores the tensions, complementarities, and legal implications of three rapidly
evolving areas of national security: cybersecurity, new technologies, and crossborder security.
I propose to talk today about the “umbrella issue” that spans all of these
topics: the emerging law of twenty-first century war. I bring to this discussion
four different perspectives: thirty-five years as an international law professor,
twenty years as a human rights lawyer, ten years in the U.S. government, and
five years as a law school dean. In each of these roles, I have focused on the
process and substance of transnational law, what I will call in shorthand
“transnational legal process” and “transnational legal substance.” By
“transnational legal process,” I mean the complex process of interaction,
interpretation, and norm-internalization by which transnational law is made in
the twenty-first century.1 By “transnational legal substance,” I mean the
substantive law that emerges from that complex interactive process.2
The core idea that drives this transnationalist jurisprudence is that
international law and domestic law are no longer artificially divided. The
∗ Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School; Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
from 2009–13; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor from 1998–2001. This is
a revised and edited version of the 2016 Randolph W. Thrower Lecture, delivered at the 2016 Thrower
Symposium at Emory Law School in Atlanta, Georgia, on February 12, 2016. It draws heavily from the third
annual Justice Stephen Breyer Lecture delivered at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. on April 1,
2016, and shares thoughts with Harold Hongju Koh, The Enduring Legacies of the Haitian Refugee Litigation,
61 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 31 (2016–17). I am grateful to the editors of the Emory Law Journal and the Thrower
family for their warm hospitality at the Thrower Symposium, the Symposium panelists, my good friends Dean
Robert Schapiro and Vice Dean Robert Ahdieh, who invited, hosted, and welcomed me to Emory, and Brian
Egan, for useful comments. I am particularly grateful to the editors of the Emory Law Journal and to Sophia
Chua-Rubenfeld and Nathaniel Zelinsky of Yale Law School for their excellent research assistance.
1 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
2 See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 6–9
(2008) (discussing transnational legal substance).
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substance that is emerging is a body of hybrid, “transnational public law,” rooted
in shared public norms that have a similar meaning in every national system
around the world. There are certain hybrid concepts, like the metric system or
the term “dot.com,” that are not clearly either international or domestic in
character. In the same way, the ideas of “cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment,” “civil society,” the “internally displaced,” and “transborder
trafficking” are now transnational public law concepts, inasmuch as they now
have a shared meaning in every domestic legal system.
In many ways, the most discussed, but least understood, of these evolving
bodies of transnational public law is the emerging law of armed conflict. This
lecture asks: What exactly is the emerging law of the twenty-first century war?
That question breaks into three, which organize this lecture. First, what basic
rules govern these twenty-first century tools? Second, what principles of law are
emerging in particular areas of modern armed conflict, namely, interrogation,
detention, special operations, drones, robots, cyber war, and private security
contractors? Third, how are these emerging law of war principles implicated by
the great crisis of today, Syria, which raises such intertwined issues as mass
migration, humanitarian intervention (or Responsibility to Protect “R2P”),3 and
the crime of aggression?
I. THE BASIC RULES
In recent years, a whole new range of tools have emerged to address the
exigencies of twenty-first century war, among them cyber conflict, drones,
special operations, private security contractors, and semi-autonomous robots.
But to what extent are these modern tools of war governed by law at all?
Centuries ago, Cicero famously wrote, “silent enim leges inter arma,” namely,
in wartime “when arms speak, the laws fall silent.”4 But is this really true with
respect to twenty-first century armed conflict?
After September 11, 2001, many asked a modern variant of Cicero, what I
call “the Tina Turner question”: “What’s law got to do with it? What’s law, but
a sweet old-fashioned notion?” Because, in one scholar’s ironic words, this was

3 See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT xii–xiii (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
4 M. TULLIUS CICERO, Pro Tito Annio Milone ad Iudicem Oratio, in CICERO: THE SPEECHES 6, 16–17
(N.H. Watts trans., 1931) (52 B.C.E.).
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a “war like no other,”5 some suggested such an existential crisis demanded that
law be abandoned. One argument sometimes heard was that the rapid changes
in the way we conduct modern war against Al Qaeda and its associated forces—
for example, Guantanamo, military commissions, or cyber war—should be
evaluated in a black hole, or law-free zone, because there can be no law to apply
to military tactics and technologies that never previously existed.
In the early days after 9/11, I rejected this view, arguing that we should not
respond this way. Instead, we should treat modern armed conflict as different,
but not unique. We should not act as if we had suddenly entered a “law-free
zone.”6 Although the law might change, the emerging issues of armed conflict
nevertheless remain issues governed by law.
I contrasted the “black hole” approach with my preferred “translation”
approach: an approach that I would argue has in fact carried the day in the fifteen
years since 9/11: namely, that we live in a time where we must translate what
Montesquieu called the “spirit of the laws”7 to the present-day situation.8 This
translation exercise necessarily occurs with many interpreters, because at
present, both the domestic and international legislative systems are peculiarly
slow to respond to current developments. So if the law to be applied to modern
problems is to be updated, it must be law that reflects modern, emerging state
practice, driven from a sense of legal obligation derived from the spirit of the
laws that previously governed nineteenth- and twentieth-century conflicts.
It takes only a moment of reflection to see how big a difference there is
between a “black hole” and a “translation” exercise with regard to the modern
law of war. If we live in a black hole, we are operating outside the law altogether.
But if we are engaged in a translation exercise from previously-agreed
international legal rules, we may debate whether or not any particular translation
is correct, but there can be no denying that we are generally operating within the
framework of the law, rather than denying its application. For example, China
might welcome the suggestion that cyberspace or the South China Sea should be
5

OWEN FISS, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER: THE CONSTITUTION

IN A

TIME

OF

TERROR (Trevor Sutton ed.,

2015).
6 Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values: The Challenge at Home and Abroad, in THE AGE OF
TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 143, 153 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds.,
2001) (“[W]hich of the available courses of action most closely comports with both the spirit and the letter of
the law? If there is such a ‘law-friendly’ course, we should follow it, because doing so will keep the law on our
side, keep us on the moral high ground, and preserve the vital support of our allies and international institutions
as the crisis proceeds.”).
7 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., 1900).
8 Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23 (2002).
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black holes because, in those zones, China has greater military capabilities that,
in Thucydides’ words, would allow “the strong [to] do what they can and the
weak [to] suffer what they must.”9
But if instead you translate, you are trying to update the spirit of the laws
that were developed for another time to a new and unexpected situation. People
can debate whether a text has been correctly translated, but obviously, there is a
huge difference between arguing over precisely where the line of legality should
be drawn when operating within the framework of law, as opposed to whether
law applies at all. The choice of translation over black hole thus implicates a
profound decision: to choose between the rule of law on the one hand, and state
practices that have been adopted for expediency’s sake, without regard to legal
foundation, on the other.
This lecture argues that even amid twenty-first century conflict, with
redefined security threats and novel tools of war, the laws are not silent. Even as
the practice of conflict has transformed, we can discern an emerging twenty-first
century law that governs it. We can also identify significant differences between
the legal approach of the Obama Administration and the one that preceded it.
For while the current Administration’s legal interpretation does not follow
verbatim from twentieth-century rules, it derives from good faith efforts to
translate the spirit of those laws to modern-day situations.10 In several emerging
areas of twenty-first century war, a new body of law has emerged—much of it
developed by U.S. practice and pronouncement—that increasingly is

9 THUCYDIDES, The Melian Dialogue, in THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 351, 352 (Robert B. Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., 1996).
10 Ten months after this lecture was delivered, the Obama Administration issued a comprehensive report
detailing how under President Obama, the United States sought to “ensur[e] that our uses of force overseas are
supported by a solid domestic law framework and consistent with an international legal framework predicated
on the concepts of sovereignty and self-defense embedded in the United Nations Charter.” Barack Obama,
Foreward to REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF
MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS i (2016) [hereinafter FRAMEWORKS REPORT],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Legal_Policy_Report.pdf. In an effort to
“encourage[] future Administrations to build on this report and carry forward the principles of transparency it
represents,” id. at ii, the Report was accompanied by President Obama’s last national security speech, President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism (Dec. 6, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-administrations-approachcounterterrorism, and a Presidential Memorandum asking the National Security Council staff to update the report
at least annually. Presidential Memorandum on Steps for Increased Legal and Policy Transparency Concerning
the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/05/presidential-memorandum-steps-increased-legal-andpolicy-transparency. Going forward, in order to connect the arguments made here to recent United States custom,
this Essay cites to points in that report that support the various assertions made here in text.
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transnationally shared with other developed nations, particularly our NATO
allies. Our challenge going forward is to clarify this body of law, set its contours,
make it more transparent, and embody it into international legal instruments.
Let me respond first to a simplistic characterization sometimes seen in the
media: that the Obama Administration’s approach to 9/11 national-security
issues is exactly the same as the George W. Bush Administration’s approach. I
would argue that in fact, there are six crucial differences.
First, who is the enemy? The Obama Administration does not believe in, or
speak of, a “global war on terror.” We are not engaged in an amorphous war on
“terror,” any more than we are engaged in an amorphous war against “drugs” or
“poverty.” Instead, the United States currently engages outside of hot
battlefields against particular transnationalist terrorist networks in military
operations that are decidedly constrained by international law principles of state
sovereignty, human rights, and humanitarian law.
Second, under domestic law, the United States does not operate based purely
on the President’s unenumerated constitutional powers. Rather, uses of force are
based on specific congressional authorizations plus constitutional power.11
Third, although some U.S. judges may disagree,12 it is broadly accepted that as
a matter of international law, these domestic authorizations should be informed
by the international laws of war. Fourth, the Obama Administration has applied
a hybrid paradigm for counterterrorism. The United States does not use an
either/or approach—either war or law enforcement—but rather combines them
into a hybrid approach.13 So what may be an appropriate warlike response
toward an ISIL leader who may be found in an unstable part of Syria may evolve
11

FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 3–8.
Compare Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (The “premise that the war powers
granted by the AUMF and other statutes are limited by the international laws of war. . . . is mistaken”), with AlBihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We decline to en banc this case to determine the role of
international law-of-war principles in interpreting the AUMF because . . . the panel’s discussion of that question
is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”). For further discussion, see Brief of the United States in
Response to Petition for Rehearing en banc at 5–6, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (May 13, 2010) (No. 095051), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/US-response-re-rehear-Al-Bihani-5-13-10.pdf
(“The Government agrees that [the majority’s] broad statement does not properly reflect the state of the law. The
Government interprets the detention authority permitted under the AUMF, as informed by the laws of war. That
interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi . . . and with longstanding Supreme
Court precedent that statutes should be construed as consistent with applicable international law.” (emphasis
added)).
13 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
12
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into a more appropriate law enforcement approach, should that very same ISIL
leader be located and captured in a stronger law enforcement environment, such
as Brussels or Paris.
Fifth, the Obama Administration has taken pains to apply a fact-based, not
label-based, approach toward identifying the enemy. To label someone as an
“enemy combatant” does not suddenly mean that, against that person, anything
goes. Rather, hard cases call for a detailed fact-based inquiry, to help determine
whether that particular person may lawfully be the subject of military action. A
lawyer must ask: precisely who is this individual, what is his history of past
hostile activity, what is his exact rank or position in the terrorist network chain
of command, and what certifiable threat level does he pose? Sixth and finally,
the Obama approach embodies an absolute commitment to humane treatment in
detention, interrogation, and targeting.14
These important differences fit into a broader, integrated Obama
Administration legal approach to targeting and detention, as part of a general
national security strategy of “smart power.” You have heard repeatedly about
“smart power” from Obama Administration’s officials, particularly Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton.15 With respect to counterterrorism policy, a smart power
approach urges that for the United States to win broader legitimacy in a broader
struggle against terrorist networks: (1) its targeting should be lawful; (2) its
detentions should be both legally authorized and legally conducted, with the
fruits of illegal detention or interrogation never being used in subsequent
proceedings; and (3) its basic strategy should be multilateral: lawful cooperation
with other states who are also at war, relying wherever possible on shared law
enforcement authorities.16
These basic legal rules derive from three sources: international criminal law
as it has developed since Nuremberg, particularly as now codified in the
International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, which criminalizes genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and, after 2017, the crime of aggression;17 the
14

President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security at the National Archives (May 21, 2009).
See, e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the John Jay School of Criminal
Justice: Smart Power Approach to Counterterrorism (Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Clinton, Remarks],
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/172034.htm. See generally HILLARY RODHAM
CLINTON, HARD CHOICES (2014).
16 See Clinton, Remarks, supra note 15; see also FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 12–14
(describing how the United States works with others in an armed conflict).
17 Int’l Criminal Court, Res. RC/Res.6, The Crime of Aggression annex I–III (June 11, 2010),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf; see also infra text accompanying
note 87.
15
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law of armed conflict, sometimes known as international humanitarian law; and
international human rights law, when it is not ousted by another, more
specialized body of law on the same issue (a controlling lex specialis.)
Under international law, to say that the United States is engaged in “armed
conflict” means that the United States is fighting against an organized, armed
group in a sustained struggle of a particular nature, intensity, and scope. That
armed conflict can be one of two traditional kinds of armed conflict: an
international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international armed conflict (NIAC),
as declared by either the state itself or by the International Committee of the Red
Cross. Thus, for example, when the United States fought Germany during World
War II, it represented a textbook international armed conflict. A noninternational armed conflict has traditionally meant armed struggle of the type
we saw in Colombia at the end of the twentieth-century: the government versus
a nonstate actor (such as the FARC) in a civil conflict that does not cross national
borders.18 But the conflict with Al Qaeda fits neatly within neither of these
categories. Although the conflict does cross borders, it remains “noninternational” because it is not an armed conflict between two nation-states. So
what we have seen in recent times is the emergence of another kind of noninternational armed conflict—between a nation-state and a transnational terrorist
network like Al Qaeda. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Justices of the Supreme
Court in 2006 apparently concluded that we have engaged in just this kind of
non-international armed conflict since 9/11.19
Under this theory, the United States is at war not with “terror” generally, but
with a specific transnational terror network that links Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces. So to be clear: homegrown sympathizers “inspired” by Al
Qaeda are not members of Al Qaeda. The Boston Marathon bombers were not
members of Al Qaeda, but rather, drew inspiration from that organization. The
Obama Administration has construed ISIL or Daesh to be part of these
18 Kelly Chen, Natalie Gallón & Rafael Romo, The Last Armed Conflict in Latin America Is Finally
Ending, CNN (Sept. 26, 2016, 9:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/26/americas/colombia-farc-peace-deal/.
19 548 U.S. 557 (2006). While there is some controversy over exactly what the Court held with regard to
armed conflict in Hamdan, everyone agrees that the Justices acknowledged that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which governs the minimum humanitarian standard in all armed conflicts, should apply. See, e.g.,
id. at 629 (“[Common Article 3] applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories.”); id.
at 641–42, 646 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (referring to “our Nation’s armed conflict with Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan” and to “our Nation’s armed conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda—a conflict that continues as
we speak”). But see Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of Armed
Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601, 616, 618 (2007) (acknowledging the Court’s Common Article 3 holding
but suggesting that the Court viewed Common Article 3 as a minimum, rather than as an exhaustive legal regime
governing detainee treatment).
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associated forces, as a splinter or offshoot of Al Qaeda Core, with Daesh now
operating as a “co-belligerent” with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, in the sense of
having entered the fight against the United States alongside these armed groups
in the so-called “hot battlegrounds”—such active theaters of battle as
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.20 As a matter of international law, until its recent
disengagement, Russia said it had been invited to fight in Syria by Assad’s
government.21 The United States is participating there against ISIL based not on
Assad’s consent, but because it acts in collective self-defense of Iraq.
Under traditional laws of war, the United States is obliged to follow both the
law of initiating war (jus ad bellum) and the law of conducting war (jus in bello).
Under domestic law, the United States must follow the terms of both the
Constitution and the various statutory authorizations for use of military force.22
Since the second half of the George W. Bush Administration, the United States
has asserted that: (1) it is in a non-international armed conflict with Al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and associated forces in response to the 9/11 attacks and subsequent
attacks and under international law, (2) it may use force consistent with the laws
of war and its inherent right to self-defense, and (3) under domestic law, the
President may engage in appropriate and necessary uses of force that Congress
has authorized by statute.23
These claims raise three questions: (1) What constitutes a valid armed
conflict? (2) When does the United States act in individual or collective selfdefense? 24 And (3) When has the state in whose territory the U.S. military action
20 For more detailed discussion of the Administration’s legal theory for using force against ISIL, see
FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 4, 11; Harold Hongju Koh, Obama’s ISIL Rollout: Bungled, Clearly.
But Illegal? Really?, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:03 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
15692/obamas-isil-legal-rollout-bungled-clearly-illegal-really/. A recent lawsuit, Smith v. Obama, challenged
the domestic legality of that legal theory but was dismissed both for lack of standing and as a political question.
See No. 16-843 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (mem.); Charlie Savage, Suit Calling War on ISIS Illegal Is Rejected,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/politics/judge-lawsuit-war-isis.html. But
see Marty Lederman, Judge Kollar-Kotelly Dismisses Captain Smith’s Suit, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Nov. 22,
2016, 8:05 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/34778/judge-kollar-kotelly-dismisses-captain-smiths-suit/
(challenging court’s political question ruling).
21 Nick Robins-Early, Russia Says Its Airstrikes in Russia Are Perfectly Legal. Are They?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 5:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/russia-airstrikes-syria-internationallaw_us_560d6448e4b0dd85030b0c08.
22 See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, § 2(b), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
23 FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 8–11.
24 Id. at 9–10. Some commentators have mistakenly construed the Obama Administration’s self-defense
arguments as virtually equivalent to the Bush Administration’s controversial doctrine of preemptive selfdefense. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Obama Has Officially Adopted Bush’s Iraq Doctrine, TIME (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://time.com/4283865/obama-adopted-bushs-iraq-doctrine/. But more discerning commentators have
understood the Obama position not as jettisoning the historical requirement of “imminence” for self-defense,
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occurs either consented to the use of force on its territory or demonstrated itself
to be unwilling or unable to suppress the threat (the paradigm case being the
U.S. raid in Pakistan on Osama bin Laden)? In armed conflict, the conduct of
armed force is governed by well-established humanitarian rules that require
distinction between civilian and military targets, and rules of necessity,
proportionality, and humanity in the use of force. So whenever you hear
presidential candidates talking about “carpet-bombing” ISIL cities, remember
that that practice would be plainly illegal.25
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions,26 which is regarded as
customary international law, states as a rule of humanity that there should be no
violence to life and persons, including no torture, taking of hostages, outrages
on personal dignity, or sentences without due process. Additional Protocol II
amplifies these guarantees and outlaws all forms of violence against those
persons who are noncombatants.27

but as instead requiring a showing of “necessity” or “last clear chance” for a nation to act to defend itself. See
Dapo Akande &Thomas Liefländer, Clarifying Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self
Defense, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 565 (2013) (“What is really at stake is whether some sort of self-defense action
is demonstrably necessary—without any alternative, including later in time—rather than how temporally remote
the threat is.”); Daniel Bethlehem, Not by Any Other Name: A Response to Jack Goldsmith on Obama’s
Imminence, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 7, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/not-any-other-nameresponse-jack-goldsmith-obamas-imminence; Marty Lederman, The Egan Speech and the Bush Doctrine:
Imminence, Necessity, and “First Use” in the Jus Ad Bellum, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Apr. 11, 2016, 8:47 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/30522/egan-speech-bush-doctrine-imminence-necessity-first-use-jus-ad-bellum/.
The British government has recently taken a similar position. See Jeremy Wright, Att’y Gen., U.K., Speech to
the International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Modern Law of Self-Defence (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-generals-speech-at-the-international-institute-for-strategicstudies.
25 Chris Megerian, Ted Cruz Wants to “Carpet Bomb” Islamic State, but with Some Limits, L.A. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-ted-cruz-carpet-bomb-20151215htmlstory.html.
26 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316.
27 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, ¶ 2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. In
March of 2011, President Obama issued a fact sheet, which stated:
The [Obama] Administration urges the Senate to act as soon as practicable on [Additional Protocol
II], to which 165 States are a party. An extensive interagency review concluded that United States
military practice is already consistent with the Protocol’s provisions. Joining the treaty would not
only assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the international community in developing the
law of armed conflict, but would also allow us to reaffirm our commitment to humane treatment
in, and compliance with legal standards for, the conduct of armed conflict.
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: NEW ACTIONS
POLICY (2011). One commentator has argued that:

ON
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II. RULES GOVERNING SPECIFIC PRACTICES
Given this background, we now turn to specific military practices, starting
with the law of interrogation.28 It is worth noting that as regards our legal
obligations, it does not matter that Al Qaeda has not signed the Torture
Conventions or the Geneva Conventions. I recall one meeting I had about ten
years ago with a senator who said, “Professor, the last time I checked, Al Qaeda
hadn’t signed either the Torture Convention or the Geneva Conventions.” I
replied, “Senator, the last time I checked, the whales hadn’t signed the Whaling
Convention either!”29 My point was that this is not about contract or bilateral
agreement, but about the minimal standards of humane treatment that we must
obey unilaterally, whether there is a written agreement. The norm of humane
treatment to which we have committed ourselves binds us, as a defining element
of our national identity, whether others agree to follow it. Senator John McCain
put it well when he said, “it’s not about them; it’s about us.”30 Additional
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, relevant parts of which the United States
follows as customary international law, further directs that there shall be no
“[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population,” 31 rendering illegal such threats—as were
recently made on the campaign trail—that in ISIL territory the United States
should see if we can make “sand . . . glow in the dark.”32

This statement by the president that U.S. practice is already consistent with the APII’s provisions,
combined with the president urging the Senate to ratify “to reaffirm our . . . compliance with legal
standards,” provides pretty clear evidence that the United States is applying the provisions of APII
as state practice and clearly imply that the United States is doing so out of legal obligation. In other
words, President Obama is declaring APII to be CIL and applying its provisions as binding on the
United States . . . .”
Eric Talbot Jensen, Presidential Pronouncements of Customary International Law as an Alternative to the
Senate’s Advice and Consent, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1525, 1539.
28 See generally FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 31–35.
29 I later repeated this point in Senate testimony. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional
Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 51 (2006) (statement of Harold Hongju
Koh, Dean, Yale Law School) (“Some have said, well, terrorists have not signed Common Article 3. Well,
whales have not signed the Whaling Convention. But it is about how we treat them and how we are obliged to
treat them.”).
30 Foster Klug, McCain: Torture Ban Protects U.S. Image, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2005, 7:10 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/14/AR2005111400247.html.
31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 51, ¶ 2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
32 Katie Glueck, Cruz Pledges Relentless Bombing to Destroy ISIL, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2015, 6:03 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/12/cruz-isil-bombing-216454 (quoting Senator Cruz as saying, “I don’t
know if sand can glow in the dark, but we’re going to find out!”).
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In addition, some presidential candidates recently argued that our
government should return to waterboarding or “a hell of a lot worse than
waterboarding.”33 Again, there is a short, clear answer to such bravado: that is
illegal behavior, and if ordered by an elected President who has taken an oath to
uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States, that is also probably a
high crime and misdemeanor, and hence an impeachable offense.34 The Torture
Convention expressly says that torture may not be justified by a state of war or
a threat of war, and that all acts of torture, wherever they can occur, must be
criminalized.35 Senator McCain made the same policy point powerfully as
well.36 So these reckless campaign statements mislead Americans about what
the realities and legalities of interrogation really are.
If you need any further convincing, you should read a recent book, Why
Torture Doesn’t Work: The Neuroscience of Interrogation, by Shane O’Mara, a
professor of experimental brain research at the University of Dublin.37 His
neuroscience research makes a very simple point: that at a cellular, neurological
level, every single specific tactic used to extract information by torture—sleep
deprivation, temperature changes, waterboarding, food restriction—inhibits
rather than enhances the victim’s ability truthfully to recall and convey accurate
memories.38 So in fact, so-called “enhanced interrogation tactics” enhance
nothing; they should be called “impaired interrogation tactics” precisely because
they destroy memory and recall. So torturing prisoners in search of accurate

33 Tom McCarthy, Donald Trump: I’d Bring Back ‘A Hell of a Lot Worse than Waterboarding’, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 7, 2016, 6:57 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/06/donald-trump-waterboardingrepublican-debate-torture.
34 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.”); accord Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1148,
1156 (2006); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 162 (4th Cir. 2016) (Floyd, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hile executive officers can declare the military reasonableness of conduct amounting to torture,
it is beyond the power of even the President to declare such conduct lawful. . . . The fact that the President—let
alone a significantly inferior executive officer—opines that certain conduct is lawful does not determine the
actual lawfulness of that conduct. The determination of specific violations of law is constitutionally committed
to the courts, even if that law touches military affairs.”).
35 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2,
¶ 2, art. 4, ¶ 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
36 See, e.g., Press Release, Senator John McCain, Statement by Senator John McCain on Inhumane
Interrogation Methods (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/2/statement-bysenator-john-mccain-on-inhumane-interrogation-methods.
37 SHANE O’MARA, WHY TORTURE DOESN’T WORK: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF INTERROGATION (2015); see
also Harold Hongju Koh, Pain Versus Gain, JUST SECURITY BLOG (June 20, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://www.
justsecurity.org/31544/pain-gain/.
38 O’MARA, supra note 37, at 183.
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information proves to be an utterly pointless act: it achieves the exact opposite
of what it is intended to do. And in the end, it harms the torturer as much as the
tortured. All of this suggests that we should stop pretending that torture is a
means to some nobler end.39 It achieves nothing but abuse. As George Orwell
so trenchantly observed, “[t]he object of torture is torture.”40
That brings us to the question of how international human rights law applies
when armed conflict is in play. This issue was addressed recently by the
International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, where the court explicitly said that the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war if there has not been
a derogation of it.41 In the Palestinian Wall case, the court further declared that
we must take account of both international human rights law and international
humanitarian law on a provision-by-provision approach. So there are some
human rights provisions whose application might prove to be impracticable in a
time of war, for example, the right to participate in elections. But other
provisions, like the right to worship, can plainly be exercised even in times of
war. Other human rights, such as the right to be free of torture and cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, are nonderogable rights that cannot be
dispensed with even in times of war or extreme emergency.42
In his book Power Wars, Charlie Savage of the New York Times recounts
how, on my last day as State Department Legal Adviser, I left behind a detailed
memorandum opinion that explained why I did not believe that it was legally
available for policymakers to claim that the Convention Against Torture did not
apply outside the United States.43 Although the internal debate within the
39 See Douglas Johnson, Alberto Mora & Averell Schmidt, The Strategic Costs of Torture: How
“Enhanced Interrogation” Hurt America, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/united-states/strategic-costs-torture; cf. Jenna Johnson, Trump Says ‘Torture Works,’ Backs
Waterboarding and ‘Much Worse’, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
trump-says-torture-works-backs-waterboarding-and-much-worse/2016/02/17/4c9277be-d59c-11e5-b195-2e29
a4e13425_story.html.
40 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 267 (1949).
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July
8).
42 See Daniel Bethlehem, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and International
Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 180, 190 (2013).
43 CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11 PRESIDENCY (2015); Office of the Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the Convention Against Torture
and Its Application in Situations of Armed Conflict 5–6 (Jan. 21, 2013); see also Marko Milanovic, Harold
Koh’s Legal Opinions on the US Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, EJIL:
TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-theextraterritorial-application-of-human-rights-treaties; Charlie Savage, U.S. Seems Unlikely to Accept that Rights
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Administration continued for another two years, in 2015, the Obama
Administration finally made this point explicit in its presentation before the
Committee Against Torture in Geneva, when Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Tom Malinowski stated that the torture
ban applies “in all places, at all times, with no exceptions,”44 and my former
principal deputy, then-Acting Legal Adviser Mary McLeod, echoed the same
notion, now embedded into U.S. law.45

Treaty Applies to Its Actions Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/
us-seems-unlikely-to-accept-that-rights-treaty-applies-to-its-actions-abroad.html.
44 Karen DeYoung, Obama Administration Endorses Treaty Banning Torture, WASH. POST (Nov. 12,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-endorses-treaty-banningtorture/2014/11/12/b6131e68-6a8c-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html.
45 Mary E. McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Acting Legal Adviser McLeod: U.S.
Affirms Torture Is Prohibited at All Times in All Places (Nov. 12, 2014), https://geneva.usmission.gov/
2014/11/12/acting-legal-adviser-mcleod-u-s-affirms-torture-is-prohibited-at-all-times-in-all-places/. Curiously,
toward the end of the Frameworks Report, the Obama Administration repeated a statement made in 2008, seven
years before its 2015 CAT presentation, stating “that Article 3 of the UNCAT [Convention Against Torture]
does not impose any legal obligations on the United States with respect to individuals located outside U.S.
sovereign territory, such that the Article is not applicable as a legal matter to transfers occurring from outside
U.S. sovereign territory, including in the context of armed conflict. . . . [A]s a matter of policy, the United States
applies the UNCAT Article 3 standard to all transfers regardless of location.” FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note
10, at 42 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). The apparent reason why this qualified statement remains
is that given, in one commentator’s words, the unequivocal “‘stated policy commitment not to send any person,
no matter where located, to a country in which it is more likely than not that the person would be subject to
torture,’ it has been unnecessary to revisit the legal question.” Marty Lederman, President Obama’s Report on
the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding and Limiting the Use of Military Force [UPDATED], JUST SECURITY
BLOG (Dec. 5, 2016, 2:45 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/35239/president-obamas-report-legal-policyframeworks-guiding-united-states-military-force-related-national-security-operations/. Yet this qualified
statement would appear to be superseded by the unequivocal U.S. statements made in text before the Committee
Against Torture in 2015, as well as by the unqualified declaration elsewhere in the Frameworks Report that
“[t]orture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDTP) are categorically prohibited under
domestic and international law, including international human rights law and the law of armed conflict. These
prohibitions exist everywhere and at all times.” FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 32 (emphasis added).
In his farewell counterterrorism speech, delivered shortly after the Frameworks Report issued, President Obama
similarly declared without qualification, “We prohibited torture, everywhere, at all times—and that includes
tactics like waterboarding.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Administration’s
Approach to Counterterrorism (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/06/
remarks-president-administrations-approach-counterterrorism. Nor can the claim that a CAT State Party’s
obligation not to transfer an individual to torture is territorially limited be squared with customary international
law. In 2001, fourteen years before the unequivocal U.S. CAT presentation, a detailed legal opinion provided to
the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees opined that the legal “responsibility of a State will be engaged in
circumstances in which acts or omissions are attributable to that State wherever these may occur.” Sir Elihu
Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, The Scope and Content of the
Principle of Non-Refoulement, 82 (June 20, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b33574d1.
pdf (emphasis added). It is thus hard to see why, even if the policy prohibition cited in the Frameworks Report
were to change, the United States would not still be legally required, as a matter of customary international law,
to apply the CAT Article 3 standard to all transfers for which it bears state responsibility, regardless of location.
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If that is the law of interrogation, what about detention? 46 As the President
made clear in his National Archives speech seven years ago, civilian trials are to
be preferred, and there is no doubt, after the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the
first version of the Military Commission order in the Hamdan case, that military
commissions must comply with the Constitution.47 Transfer of detainees from
Guantanamo continues, so that forty-one detainees were left48 at the end of the
Obama Administration. An executive order on periodic review is being
implemented to determine which detainees should continue to be held and which
may be released.49 And now, finally embodied in the most recent National
Defense Authorization Act, is an absolute statutory guarantee of humane
treatment.50
I am sometimes asked: “As a human rights lawyer who opposes torture, how
can you defend the use of drones?” My answer is quite simple: all torture is
illegal and the President cannot be torturer in chief—this is an absolute ban
under all circumstances.51 But targeted killing in warfare can be lawful or
unlawful, depending upon whether it is done according to the laws of war. If we
are indeed in an armed conflict, we can lawfully engage in certain kinds of lethal
warfare. You may not like targeted killing, but if you are a lawyer in the
government addressing these matters, it is your inescapable duty to draw the line
between those uses of force that are or are not lawful.
Targeted killing can be lawful when conducted against someone not in
government custody who poses an imminent threat, as an act of self-defense, or
in armed conflict against a combatant who has no immunity under the Geneva
Conventions.52 As President Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court
suggested, targeted killing may in some cases be more consistent with human
rights norms than other forms of warfare because of the lower possibility of

46 See FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 28–31 (discussing detention of individuals in armed
conflict).
47 Obama, supra note 14; see also FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 36–39 (discussing prosecution
of individuals through the criminal justice stem and military commissions).
48 The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last updated Jan. 19,
2017).
49 Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011).
50 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1045, 129 Stat.
726, 977 (2015); Marty Lederman, The President’s NDAA Signing Statement re: GTMO and Anti-Torture
Provisions, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Nov. 25, 2015, 9:50 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27939/presidentsndaa-signing-statement-re-gtmo-anti-torture-provisions/.
51 See Koh, supra note 34, at 1167.
52 See generally FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, at 19–21.
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collateral damage.53 But what is necessary to make targeted killing lawful is first,
that the action be duly authorized under both domestic and international law;
second, that the targeted person’s rights have been adequately considered; and
third, that the sovereignty of the country in which the action occurs have been
adequately respected. If all of this is done correctly, targeted killing does not
constitute unlawful extra-judicial killing, execution, or assassination, and can be
lawfully carried out by drone or special operations, as in the case of Osama bin
Laden.54 Certainly, there are weapons that are inherently illegal—in my
judgment, for example, chemical weapons, antipersonnel land mines,
unexploded ordinance, and cluster bombs—but drones do not fall into that
category; they may lawfully be used for certain targeted operations that meet
carefully defined criteria. What determines whether they are lawful is precisely
how they are used.
To grasp this commonsense point, consider the following thought
experiment: suppose that shortly after Congress had authorized the use of
military force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001, the President had come
out and said:
A week ago, we were attacked in the worst attack ever to occur on our
soil. More than three thousand innocent people were killed simply for
going to work. This is a gross human rights violation and act of war to
which we must respond. But in responding, here is what I will not do:
I will not torture anyone, I will not open Guantanamo, I will not invade
Iraq, I will not conduct kidnappings or illegal extraordinary rendition
to torture. I will not violate people’s rights by overbroad surveillance.
I will cooperate with our allies lawfully and multilaterally in a
transparent fashion. But if the only place I can find bin Laden and his
supporters is in a remote cave in Tora Bora, and the only way I can
reach them is by drone, I will have no choice but to use that lawful
method, in accordance with the laws of war. And I say to our allies and
the American people: please support me in this effort.

Obviously, a lot of water has flowed under the dam since that speech was not
made. But what it should tell you is that it is not the use of drones per se that is
illegal. It is the way in which other mistaken aspects of U.S. national security
policy have been conducted in the years since 2001 that has put a cloud over so
much of what the United States has lawfully done in response to 9/11.
53

HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov’t of Israel (2) IsrLR 459, 473 (2006) (Isr.).
Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Military Operation Against Osama bin Laden, OPINIO
JURIS (May 19, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us-operation-againstosama-bin-laden/.
54
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Upon taking office, President Obama made clear that his goal was to obey
law even in times of armed conflict. He said this in his inauguration speech, in
his 2009 National Archives speech, and again in his Nobel Prize speech in
December of that year.55 At the National Defense University in May 2013, he
emphasized that a smart power approach can include drones as an effective,
discriminate tool to help dismantle specific networks that threaten the United
States.56 In that far-ranging speech, he made clear his preference for capture over
kill and America’s respect for state sovereignty.57 He also expressed a
commitment to the notion that self-defense may be invoked to use force against
a continuing imminent threat (based on a necessarily elongated notion of
“imminence”)58 against senior operational leaders who are clearly determined to
strike against the United States, so long as there is a “near-certainty that no
civilians will be killed or injured.”59 Currently, these are policy rules embedded
in a classified Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG)60 summarized in a Fact
Statement issued alongside the 2013 NDU Speech.61 A redacted version of that
PPG was recently declassified.62 In December 2016, the Obama Administration
embodied these principles into a comprehensive “legal and policy frameworks”
document issued shortly before President Obama left office, which sought to set
forth a detailed explanation of how the various U.S. practices developed during
that Administration are consistent with the laws of war.63
55 See Obama, supra note 14; President Barack Obama, Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace (Dec. 10,
2009) [hereinafter Obama, Nobel Lecture], https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/
obama-lecture.html; President Barack Obama, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/01/21/president-barack-obamas-inaugural-address.
56 President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
57 Id.
58 See Wright, supra note 24. See generally Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770, 770–72, 774, 776 (2012).
59 Obama, supra note 57.
60 Id.
61 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE, U.S. POLICY STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE USE
OF FORCE IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE
HOSTILITIES (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact_sheet_on_ppg.
pdf.
62 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY GUIDANCE, PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT
ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE
HOSTILITIES (May 22, 2013) [hereinafter PPG], https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_
approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download (redacted).
63 See FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 10, 24–26. After this lecture was delivered, the President also
issued an executive order calling for regular disclosure of civilian casualty statistics. See id. at 26–27; Exec.
Order No. 13,732, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,485 (July 1, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/
07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures; see also Charlie Savage & Scott
Shane, U.S. Reveals Death Toll from Airstrikes Outside War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://www.
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To go further, we can translate these practices into codes of conduct and
internalize them into private behavior through private contracts as rules that can
govern the conduct of private security contractors. This has been done in a
public–private arrangement called the Montreux Document,64 which has led to
the adoption of an International Code of Conduct (ICOC) to govern private
security practices.65
What about robots? The law of war does not yet treat autonomous robots as
a per se illegal instrument. But I believe that fully autonomous robots that do not
have a human operator in the loop, insofar as they select and engage targets
independently of human supervision—think The Terminator—should be treated
as per se illegal weapons of war. At the same time, semi-autonomous robots that
have human beings in the loop can be programmed to operate under the legal
principles described above, inasmuch as the human operators of those robots can
apply principles analogous to those stated in the President’s NDU speech, PPG
and Frameworks Report to comply with the emerging laws of war.
Finally, let me touch briefly on the difficult question of cyber intrusions, a
topic that could easily occupy an entire lecture of its own. These intrusions run
a wide gamut of conduct. We need to distinguish between a spectrum of activity
that runs from: (1) cyber monitoring, defense and espionage, and hacking, which
can be done by private parties, to (2) computer network exploitation (CNE),
which is a form of intelligence, and (3) pernicious forms of consumer network
attack (CNA), which can have broader, physical consequences, such as using a
computer to open a dam or to shut down a hospital. Given that these physical
effects are no different from simply bombing the dam or hospital, such
destructive cyber acts should be plainly governed by the laws of war. In 2012, I
gave a speech at Cyber Command called “International Law in Cyberspace,”

nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-reveals-death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.html. In my view,
more steps toward transparency and standard-setting should still be taken. See Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks at
the Oxford Union: How to End the Forever War? 14 (May 7, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013-5-7-corrected-koh-oxford-union-speech-as-delivered.pdf (“[T]he real issue . . . is not drone
technology per se, but the need for transparent, agreed-upon domestic and international legal process and
standards.” (emphasis omitted)).
64 U.N. General Assembly Security Council, Annex to the Letter Dated Oct. 2, 2008 from the Permanent
Representative of Switzerland to the Secretary-General: Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal
Obligations and Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During
Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/63/467-S/2008/636 (2008).
65 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, INT’L CODE CONDUCT ASS’N,
http://www.icoca.ch/en/the_icoc (last visited June 23, 2016).
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which stated ten currently agreed-upon international rules of cyber conflict.66
That speech made clear that international law applies in cyberspace, that
cyberspace is neither a law-free zone nor a black hole, and that forms of cyber
activity can, under certain circumstances, represent a use of force to which the
laws of jus ad bellum and jus in bello apply, with states being responsible for
their own actions, as well as the acts of proxy actors. A series of legal experts
have engaged in an extended exercise called the Tallinn Manual (which has
recently moved to a 2.0 stage), which has sought to elaborate these emerging
rules in considerable detail.67 But to further legalize cyber conflict, we need to
promote more official standard-setting exercises through diplomatic negotiation
before global fora like the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE),68 to keep
translating the laws of war to rapidly evolving technological capacities, and to
make it even clearer that cyber conflict is governed by translated law-of-war
standards.
III. SYRIA
Sadly, we must end with Syria, a tragic story that you all know too well69:
the five-year civil war, the gross violations of human rights and humanitarian
law, the armed conflict, the migrant crisis, the border closings, and the growing
discrimination against those refugees fleeing, whom some fear hale in part from
ISIL. The current horrible tally stands at over 250,000 dead, over six million
displaced, and almost five million refugees, two million of them children.70 In
66 Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARV. INT’L. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2–7 (2012). For
a recent, illuminating follow-on speech by Brian Egan, my successor as State Department Legal Adviser, see
Brian J. Egan, Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm.
67 Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed,
54 HARV. INT’L. L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012).
68 See Elaine Korzak, The 2015 GGE Report: What Next for Norms in Cyberspace?, LAWFARE BLOG (Sept.
23, 2015, 8:32 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/2015-gge-report-what-next-norms-cyberspace.
69 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 53 HOUS. L. REV.
971, 998–1004, 1028–33 (2016) [hereinafter Koh, War Powers], which the discussion in text that follows
summarizes.
70 See, e.g., Howard Forman, Caring for 2 Million Refugee Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 2,
2016, 6:00 AM), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/patient-advice/articles/2016-02-02/caring-for-2million-refugee-children; Syria Crisis: Regional Overview: About the Crisis, U.N. OFFICE FOR COORDINATION
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.unocha.org/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-profile/about-crisis
(last visited Apr. 16, 2016). For a discussion of the humanitarian crisis, see Michael Ignatieff, The Refugees and
the New War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-andnew-war/, and Michael Ignatieff & Leon Wieseltier, Enough Is Enough—U.S. Abdication on Syria Must Come
to an End, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-era-of-us-abdication -onsyria-must-end/2016/02/09/55226716-ce96-11e5-88cd-753e80cd29ad_story.html.
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his last State of the Union Address, President Obama suggested that the best
approach to a conflict like Syria is a smart power approach.71
One legal issue being raised over and over is whether it is lawful for the
United States to lead a collective effort to enter Syrian territory to try to mitigate
the humanitarian disaster. A series of questions have been raised throughout the
last five years of this Administration: (1) Is it lawful to give humanitarian
assistance within Syria? (2) Is it lawful to support Syrian rebels with lethal or
nonlethal aid? (3) As Aleppo remains divided and refugees flock to the border
between Aleppo and Turkey,72 is it possible to set up a humanitarian corridor or
safe zone to give those refugees some sort of humanitarian protection?
Some claim that the U.N. Charter article 2(4) is absolute under these
circumstances, and that it is a per se illegal violation of state sovereignty to take
military action without U.N. Security Council resolution to prevent or mitigate
gross abuses.73 But if this bright-line rule were in fact true, then any of the
permanent five members of the United Nations could commit genocide against
its own citizens and veto all objecting Security Council resolutions, and no one
could do anything about it. Maybe somebody can explain to me how that is
consistent with the core values of the United Nations, which include the
promotion and protection of human rights.74 This is a moment to question that
overbroad legal claim, as several of the NATO allies did during Kosovo itself.
Some have called humanitarian intervention of the Kosovo kind “illegal but
legitimate.”75 But as a distinguished international commission headed by former
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy pointed out, if the U.N. Security
Council fails to discharge its responsibilities, concerned states will not rule out
other means and forms of action in response.76 In his 2009 Nobel Prize Lecture,
President Obama made clear that he believed that, as in the Balkans, under

71 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2016/01/12/remarks-president-barack-obama-%E2%80%93-prepared-delivery-state-unionaddress.
72 See Ilgin Yorulmaz, Turkey Criticizes World Leaders for Lack of Syrian Refugee Response, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/turkey-syria-refugees-united-nations_us_57e5b
325e4b0e28b2b543466.
73 See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Opinion, On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-un-vote-isnt-optional.html.
74 U.N. Charter pmbl.
75 INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT 4 (2000), http://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf.
76 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 3, at xiii.
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certain circumstances, use of force for humanitarian purposes can be justified.77
Although as a policy matter he has apparently concluded not to use force in
Syria,78 he has just as plainly suggested that under some circumstances, he would
consider force or the threat of force to be a lawful option.79
Elsewhere, I have argued at length that nearly twenty years after Kosovo, we
need to question the notion that calling Kosovo-style humanitarian intervention
“illegal but legitimate” must be our legal ending point.80 Where else do we do
this in human rights law? Did we say that same-sex marriage was “illegal but
legitimate,” or did we take collective action to make it lawful? Ironically, those
who claim that there is a bright-line, black-letter, absolutist rule barring
humanitarian intervention absent Security Council resolution take the kind of
narrow textualist interpretive approach that I associate with the late Justice
Scalia. To simply pronounce that “a rule is a rule is a rule and it has been so
since the Founding” creates an intolerable bias towards inaction in the face of
gross abuses, even after several decades of debate of attempting to revise
international law to define a narrow Responsibility to Protect in the name of
human rights.
To make this argument need not mean that anything goes. As I have recently
specified elsewhere, when a state faces a situation of gross violence causing
disruptive consequences likely to lead to imminent threats to peace and security,
and all other remedies have been exhausted, the humanitarian use of force may

77 See Obama, Nobel Lecture, supra note 56 (“I believe that force can be justified on humanitarian grounds,
as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our conscience and
can lead to more costly intervention later. That’s why all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries
with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.”).
78 See Jeffrey Goldberg, The Obama Doctrine, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (interviewing President Obama regarding, inter
alia, his policies in Syria).
79 See Koh, War Powers, supra note 70, at 999–1000 (“[T]he [White House] Counsel explained that, while
an attack on Syria ‘may not fit under a traditionally recognized legal basis under international law,’ given the
novel factors and circumstances, such an action would nevertheless be ‘justified and legitimate under
international law’ and so not prohibited. As a matter of domestic law, the Administration also apparently
concluded that congressional approval was not required. As the New York Times reported, ‘[A]dministration
lawyers decided that it was within Mr. Obama’s constitutional authority to carry out a strike on Syria as well,
even without permission from Congress or the Security Council, because of the “important national interests”
of limiting regional instability and of enforcing the norm against using chemical weapons . . . .’ The White House
Counsel stated that ‘[t]he President believed that it was important to enhance the legitimacy of any action that
would be taken by the executive . . . to seek Congressional approval of that action and have it be seen, again as
a matter of legitimacy both domestically and internationally, that there was a unified American response to the
horrendous violation of the international norm against chemical weapons use.’”).
80 See generally id.
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be lawful if limited to necessary and proportionate action.81 If such action is
done collectively—as NATO acted in Kosovo82—to prevent the use of illegal
means, like chemical weapons, for illegal ends such as war crimes, the use of
force in these circumstances can be legally justified. One can analogize this
situation to the Good Samaritan principle in domestic tort law. Tort law rarely
preauthorizes bystanders to use force for humanitarian motives, for fear that they
will abuse this license. But if those bystanders do act in a careful fashion, for the
limited purpose of preventing much worse outcomes, the law will hold them
exempt from wrongfulness after the fact. In such cases, we fully recognize the
tension the conduct raises with the letter of the law, but invoke an affirmative
defense so as not to render socially desirable conduct illegal. Here too, isn’t it
the task of international lawyers to develop the law in this area to better serve
the cause of human dignity?
To say that under the right circumstances, it could be lawful to make a
targeted use or threat of force as part of a broader smart power approach is not
to call for an unnuanced policy of intervention. As a former human rights
policymaker, I have learned to be very cautious about policy arguments for
military intervention, which are undeniably often wrong-headed.83 At the same
time, the idea that a noninterventionist position is legally required in Syria must
be tested against the hard reality that almost everyone under the sun is already
intervening in Syria. Thus, under these circumstances, the nonintervention
position for the West may not actually be a pro-peace position, but rather a
slaughter-tolerating position, in which the Western powers invoke supposedly
inflexible legal rules as a reason to do nothing.
More than twenty years ago, I warned that there are times when our failure
to take meaningful policy action earlier can lead to what I call “the Haiti
Paradigm in human rights policy.”84 My thesis there was that when a global
crisis arises, the world too often under responds to the root causes. As a matter
of human rights policy in Syria, for example, the time for more action was
81

See id. at 1011 (stating international legal test for humanitarian intervention).
INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, supra note 76, at 4.
83 As Nicholas Kristof has rightly cautioned: “Let’s be humble enough to acknowledge that we can’t be
sure of the answer and that Syria will be bloody whatever we do.” Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, The Right
Questions on Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/kristof-the-rightquestions-on-syria.html. The shifting balance of power in the civil war, the proliferation of questionable armed
groups on both sides, the risk of mission creep, and the uncertainty of follow-on consequences from any military
strike all demand caution, particularly if one starts from the premise, “first, do no harm.”
84 See Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J.
2391, 2392 (1994).
82
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probably earlier, not later. But when both the multilateral system and the U.S.
government under-responded, the failure to address root causes in a timely
fashion led to an overpowering refugee crisis that now swamps Europe, Turkey,
Jordan, and Lebanon.85 The irony is that the bulk of the policy reaction in both
Europe and the United States will now likely be directed against the refugees,
not the root causes of the refugee crisis. And if that harsh response is legitimated
by the courts, we will end up with a perversely upside down human rights policy:
one that is too soft on the human rights abusers and too harsh on the innocents
who are fleeing from those abusers.
The Haiti Paradigm is recurring in a somewhat different way in Syria
because the European Court of Human Rights has largely ruled illegal the option
of governments intercepting and returning Syrians on the high seas.86 Yet once
refugees have landed on shore, they have been pushed away by deterrence laws,
of the kind being enacted by a number of European states.87 Because of the scale
of the refugee crisis, an even greater danger has emerged: that if the United
States does nothing, Europe will quite literally break. As I speak, three essential
features of Europe are under intense pressure: the Eurozone,88 the Schengen
Zone of immigration,89 and the very membership of the European Union, which
is being threatened by both British and Greek threats to exit (Brexit and
Grexit).90

85

See Ignatieff & Wieseltier, supra note 71.
See, e.g., Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 37 (2012) (“When [Libyans] were removed,
the Italian authorities knew or should have known that, as irregular migrants, they would be exposed in Libya to
treatment in breach of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] . . . .”); M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App.
No. 30696/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); Medveyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27 (2010) (“[T]he
special nature of the maritime environment relied upon by the Government in the instant case cannot justify an
area outside the law where ships’ crews are covered by no legal system capable of affording them enjoyment of
the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which the States have undertaken to secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction . . . .”).
87 See, e.g., Jacques Hartmann & Nikolas Feith Tan, The Danish Law on Seizing Asylum Seekers’ Assets,
EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-danish-law-on-seizing-asylum-seekers-assets/
(describing a recent Danish law that gives police broad powers to search and confiscate valuables from people
seeking asylum, with the evident goal of trying to deter asylum-seekers from entering the country).
88 Paul Hannon & Tom Fairless, Eurozone Prices Fall, Piling Pressure on ECB, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 29,
2016, 5:14 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eurozone-prices-fall-piling-pressure-on-ecb-1456740845.
89 Ian Traynor, EU Migration Crisis: Greece Threatened with Schengen Area Expulsion, GUARDIAN (Jan.
25, 2016, 9:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/25/greece-under-growing-pressure-to-stemflow-of-refugees-and-migrants-into-eu.
90 On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted in an historic referendum for Brexit: British exit from the
European Union, a decision that has thrown both the British Isles and Europe into turmoil and created myriad
legal puzzles going forward. For ongoing coverage of the legal issues arising from Brexit, see ‘Brexit’: Britain’s
Decision to Leave the E.U., N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/news-event/britain-brexit-european-union
86
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America simply cannot afford to be a bystander while Europe breaks. There
are a set of actions that the United States can and must take to prevent the
situation from further deteriorating.91 In my view, the United States must take
the lead in reviving negotiations to achieve a peace accord in Geneva. The
United States must work with the embattled governments of Turkey and Jordan
to help manage refugee flows. The United States must give support to stabilize
Germany where Chancellor Angela Merkel heroically has stood almost alone in
generating a humanitarian response to the refugee outflows.92 The United States
must take in more refugees itself. To finance these actions, the allies must seek
other sources of financing: they may be able to tap into frozen Syrian assets and
demand more funding from Saudi Arabia and other allies in the region, so that
Turkey’s refugee camps can be emptied in an orderly basis into other parts of
Europe. President Obama should seek to secure meaningful long-term solutions
to this problem at the World Humanitarian Summit and the U.N. meeting on
mass migration93 scheduled to occur before he leaves office.94 The United States
can press for a resolution expanding the mandate of the U.N. High
Commissioner on Refugees,95 mobilize private relief, and help to develop a new
regime for international travel visas created under international authority.
Finally, the United States should pursue all available mechanisms of
accountability against Assad and the other authors of the human rights debacle.
I offer this brief list of policy suggestions not because I think anyone will
agree with or adopt all of them, but to respond to the defeatist claim that because
Syria is already a lost cause, there is literally nothing anyone can do today to
solve the crisis in Syria. At this writing, Aleppo has fallen to Assad’s forces, and

(last visited July 27, 2016), and Brexit Law, BRICK COURT CHAMBERS BREXIT LAW BLOG,
https://brexit.law/2016/07/04/welcome-to-the-brick-court-brexit-law-blog/ (last visited July 30, 2016).
91 Michael Ignatieff and his students have developed a comprehensive integrated plan for Syria that
incorporates a number of these elements. See Michael Ignatieff et al., The United States and the Syrian Refugee
Crisis: A Plan of Action, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POLITICS & PUB. POLICY
(Jan. 27, 2016, 3:00 PM), http://shorensteincenter.org/united-states-syrian-refugee-crisis-plan-action/.
92 Kate Connolly, Angela Merkel Defends Germany’s Refugee Policy After Attacks, GUARDIAN (July 28,
2016, 1:41 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/merkel-rejects-calls-to-change-germanysrefugee-policy-after-attacks.
93 See World Humanitarian Summit 2016, INT’L COUNCIL VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, https://icvanetwork.
org/world-humanitarian-summit-0 (last visited July 30, 2016).
94 See High-Level Plenary Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, INT’L
COUNCIL VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, https://icvanetwork.org/node/7228 (last visited July 30, 2016) (announcing
that the meeting will be held on September 19, 2016).
95 United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on the Mandate of the High Commissioner for
Refugees and His Office (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/526a22cb6/mandate-highcommissioner-refugees-office.html.
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debate continues to rage inside and outside the U.S. government over what
would constitute the best way to end the Syria crisis.96 But doing nothing cannot
be our only option. Nor can it be that as the crisis escalates, our only option is to
bomb ISIL and to leave alone Assad, who is undoubtedly the proximate cause
of the refugee crisis. So this is a crisis that will require all of our policy tools. If
force is legally available, it may help to protect humanitarian corridors, to deter
bad behavior, or to jumpstart diplomacy—as it did at Dayton—by giving
incentives for the recalcitrant parties finally to come to the table during a binding
cessation of hostilities.97 To be clear: I am not urging the use of force for its own
sake. But in my view, having the smart power option of diplomatic intervention
backed by the lawful threat of limited military intervention is a better policy
option than simply doing nothing, particularly when Assad has made it clear that
he has no hesitations about repeated, deliberate large-scale attacks on civilian
populations.
One final point: we should not forget the looming crime of aggression, which
will be activated by the International Criminal Court in 2017. Again, this debate
could occupy volumes, but I point you here simply to a detailed article on the
topic recently published in the American Journal of International Law.98 If
Western leaders in NATO engage in collective humanitarian intervention to
prevent a future Rwanda or Kosovo, for example, can they be charged with
aggression at the International Criminal Court? And if that were done, wouldn’t
that have the counterproductive effect of deterring much-needed human rights
action? Isn’t it perverse to say that the only remedy that we have against crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide is episodic, after-the-fact
punishment, because international law permits no ex ante remedy that allows us
96 See, e.g., Mark Landler, 51 U.S. Diplomats Urge Strikes Against Assad in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (June 16,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/middleeast/syria-assad-obama-airstrikes-diplomats-memo.
html (describing dissenting view of State Department diplomats encouraging greater use of force as part of a
broader diplomatic solution); Robin Wright, Former Ambassador Robert Ford on the State Department Mutiny
on Syria, NEW YORKER (June 17, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/former-ambassadorrobert-ford-on-the-state-department-mutiny-on-syria; Harold Hongju Koh, “Effective” Policy in Syria:
Ambassador Robert Ford’s View, JUST SECURITY BLOG (June 21, 2016, 9:50 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
31590/effective-policy-syria-ambassador-robert-fords-view; Harold Hongju Koh, Another Legal View of the
Dissent Channel Cable on Syria, JUST SECURITY BLOG (June 20, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
31571/legal-view-dissent-channel-cable-syria/.
97 Cf. RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1998) (describing the use of diplomacy backed by force to
bring about the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia).
98 Harold Hongju Koh & Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109
AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (2015); see also THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A COMMENTARY (Claus Kreß & Stefan Barriga
eds., 2017); Tom Dannenbaum, Why Have We Criminalized Aggressive War?, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2017).
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to prevent such gross violations? Does it make sense to chill humanitarian
intervention by criminalizing legitimate efforts to undertake such prevention?
Clearly, this is a looming problem that demands more thoughtful, collective
consideration before the crime of aggression is finalized. As international
lawyers, we need to work together to trigger more thoughtful discussions to
figure out a better and more stable long-term solution.
CONCLUSION
Every topic I have addressed in this lecture could obviously be discussed in
much greater detail. But at a minimum, having this overview should force us to
reconsider whether it remains true today that in wartime, the laws fall silent. On
reflection, that just is not true, even if the modalities of modern warfare are
rapidly evolving. In today’s armed conflict, the laws are far from silent. Even as
the means of modern warfare rapidly mutate, there is an emerging body of the
twenty-first century law of war. That law does not follow verbatim from
twentieth century law, but it does represent a good faith effort not to treat modern
warfare as a legal black hole, but rather, to translate the spirit of those laws to
present-day circumstances. These laws govern interrogation, detention, drones,
special operations, private security contractors, and the Responsibility to
Protect, and we face special challenges with regard to the ongoing crisis in Syria.
Our challenge going forward is how to clarify these rules and to make them more
formal, transparent, and subject to external oversight.
If you want to recall this lecture in a single phrase, my message would be:
“We do not have to apply the Tina Turner Doctrine,” i.e., “What’s law got to do
with it?” Whatever you may hear, in this area, law simply is not “a sweet oldfashioned notion.” Whether you agree with all the particulars that I have
discussed, I hope you agree that, like Randolph Thrower, our job as lawyers who
serve the law is to better develop nascent norms. That work will help us to deal
with the redefined security threats and new tools of armed conflict for the next
century and beyond.
Some fear that the incoming Trump administration will jettison or radically
modify these rules, but unraveling such a complex set of legal principles is easier
said than done. As I have elsewhere argued, “[t]he U.S. government does not
turn on a dime, or instantly dance to the tune of its latest elected leader.”99 In
99 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Next Four Years: A Thanksgiving Strategy, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Nov.
23, 2016, 8:32 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/34868/years-thanksgiving-strategy-harold-koh/; see also
Luke Hartig, Can Trump Unravel Obama’s Rules of War?, JUST SECURITY BLOG (Jan. 5, 2017, 11:12 AM),
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modern war, the laws need not fall silent simply because the tools of conflict are
evolving. Nor must the emerging rules be abandoned simply because of a change
of government. In the years ahead, not just the United States, but all
governmental and nongovernmental players within the transnational legal
process,100 will have a great deal of emerging law to develop, apply, codify, and
enforce. That law is the translated law of twenty-first century war.

https://www.justsecurity.org/36013/trump-unravel-obamas-rules-war/ (“Although Trump himself has chosen
his senior national security leadership, those officials will inherit a cadre of career operators, intelligence
officials, lawyers, and policy analysts who hold themselves to very high standards not only because Obama
directed them to do so, but because they are professionals who have struggled with the ethical and strategic
implications of American policies for 15 years. It will take more than an election and tough campaign talk to
change all that.”).
100 See generally sources cited supra note 1.

